Publications
Books
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Articles
24. ‘Divine Simplicity and Divine Power, Not Lowe Simple’, (forthcoming) in M. Guta, and E. LaRock, eds., E. J. Lowe’s Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology. Routlegde.
Is contemporary work on the metaphysics of powers of any use in helping us understand the power of a divine and simple being? This is the question I wish to answer in this question. Here I will construct what I take to be the most plausible ways contemporary power metaphysics helps us answer this question, with some of the moved made being heavily inspired by the work of E. J. Lowe. Ultimately, I aim to show that contemporary metaphysicians have much to offer those interested in this aspect of the divine nature and that the metaphysical work of Lowe and others has potential avenues for philosophers of religion to mine.
23. ‘Knowing the end from the beginning’, (2025) AGATHEOS: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2:1-16.
There is an objection posed against Brian Leftow’s conception of a timeless God which claims that God cannot know the temporal order of events, with Craig going so far as to assert that on Leftow’s view God’s life will be chaotic. If this objection is right then Leftow’s God cannot know the end from the beginning. This paper sets out the objection, describing how it arises from Leftow’s Anselmian view of God’s relationship to Creation and then shows several ways in which the objection can be overcome. Much of this centres around discussions of the direction of time and how Leftow’s God could know this direction. The paper then concludes by noting that what has come before can be modified so that other conceptions of divine timelessness can also explain how God knows the temporal order of Creation’s events.
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22. ‘O Precreation, where Art thou?’, (2025) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 98:145-171.
The thought that even though God has created, He actually existed alone without creation, what I’ll call ‘Precreation’, seems to be a key premise in some contemporary arguments against divine atemporalism. The question this paper addresses is whether we have any strong reasons for affirming Precreation. Before answering this question I will discuss how Precreation is understood and then how some arguments against divine atemporalism employ this notion. The bulk of the paper then examines the main arguments for endorsing Precreation and concludes that they don’t provide good grounds for adopting it. As a result, I suggest that atemporalists shouldn’t be troubled by those arguments against their view which require Precreation since they can plausibly reject those premises.
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21. ‘Non-reductive Approaches to the Metaphysics of Powers: An Introduction’, (2025) Philosophy Compass 20:e70049.
Non-reductive theories of powers/dispositions/capacities/potencies/potentialities are of much interest within contemporary metaphysics. There have been many discussions which attempt to explicate their nature as well as numerous others which suggest their application. Here I focus on providing an introduction to the former, the metaphysics of non-reductive powers, whilst briefly commenting on the latter, their applications. The paper will therefore offer a map of the debates and positions taken within present discussion.
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20. ‘Eternal Omni-Powers’, (2025) Faith and Philosophy 41:43-69.
Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerful entity there is, God. As such, recent work on the ontology of powers may well have much to offer theists when thinking about God’s power. In this paper I start to provide a metaphysics of God’s ‘power’, something many definitions of omnipotence make reference to. In particular I will be interested in explicating how a power ontology can account for the strength and range of God’s power, as well as showing how this account of divine power can fit with a timeless conception of God.
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19. ‘Omnipresence and Special Presence’, (2025) in A. Marmodoro, D. Migliorini, & B. Page, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Omnipresence. Oxford University Press.
Whilst God is said to be omnipresent, some religions also claim that God is specially present, or more present at/in certain locations. For example, a claim of special presence shared by Christians and Jews is that God was specially present at/in the first Temple. The chapter canvases various ways in which one can make sense of this claim whilst still affirming the omnipresence of God. This includes offering different accounts of special presence relying on derivative notions of presence, and offering other views of special presence that rely upon fundamental accounts of presence. The chapter itself does not argue for one view in particular, but instead offers a map of possible options and future areas for research.
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18. ”Block’ing Evil’s Defeat’, (2025) Religious Studies 61:380-394.
There is this view propounded by some theorists which claims that some conceptions of the nature of time are incompatible with the Christian position on the defeat of evil. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to clarify exactly which thesis about time’s nature is taken to be problematic for the defeat of evil. And secondly, to show that scriptural support for understanding the defeat of evil as requiring that evil not be in the range of the existential quantifier, something implicitly contended by those who put forward this problem, is weak and that these passages can be read in plausible ways which are affirmable by those who endorse the ‘problematic’ thesis.
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17. ‘Timelessness à la Leftow’, (2025) TheoLogica 9:355-383.
Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow’s view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it’s because many struggle to understand Leftow’s view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow’s account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow’s view in the future.
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16. ‘The Creation Objection Against Timelessness Fails’, (2023) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93:169-188.
In recent years Mullins and Craig have argued that there is a problem for a timeless God creating, with Mullins formulating the argument as follows: (1) If God begins to be related to creation, then God changes. (2) God begins to be related to creation. (3) Therefore, God changes. (4) If God changes, then God is neither immutable nor timeless. (5) Therefore, God is neither immutable nor timeless. In this paper I argue that all the premises, (1), (2), and (4) are false, and then provide a revised formulation of the argument which more clearly represents what Mullins and Craig wish to argue, given the explication and commentary they give when discussing this objection to timelessness. I then call into question this argument, and conclude by stating what I think Mullins and Craig should really be arguing given the specific views they have about creation ex nihilo and in virtue of what timelessness requires.
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15. ‘Presentism, Timelessness, and Evil’, (2023) TheoLogica 7:111-137.
There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted since on this view evil is never “destroyed,”“vanquished,”“eradicated”or defeated. By contrast,some divine temporalists think that presentism is the key that allows evil to be destroyed, vanquished, eradicated, or defeated. However, since presentism is often considered to be inconsistent with timelessness, it is thought that the presentist solution is not available for defenders of timelessness. In this paper I first show how divine timelessness is consistent with a presentist view of time and then how defenders of Presentist-Timelessness can adopt the presentist solution to the removal of evil. After this,I conclude the paper by showing that it’s far from clear that the presentist solution is successful and that unless one weakens what is meant by the destruction, vanquishing, eradication, or defeat of evil, one can only make the presentist solution work by adopting a number of additional assumptions that many will find unattractive.
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14. ‘Libertarian Freedom in an Eternalist World’, (2022) in C. Austin, A. Marmodoro, & A. Roselli, eds., Powers, Time and Free Will. Springer.
My students sometimes worry that if eternalism is true then they can’t have libertarian freedom. They aren’t alone, as this sentiment is also expressed, albeit typically briefly, by various philosophers. However, somewhat surprisingly, those working within the free will literature have largely had nothing to say about libertarianism’s relationship to time, with this also being similar in the case of those working in the philosophy of time, apart from some work which has mainly focused on non-libertarian views of freedom. In this short paper I note why I’m currently unconvinced that there’s an incompatibility between eternalism and libertarianism, and in doing so one will see why I think they are compatible. In order to do this I will first outline what I take to be the central tenets of both eternalism and libertarianism. I then begin to explore potential avenues of incompatibility, discussing firstly whether an eternalist can make sense of the principle of alternative possibilities, and then if fixity, the fact that how I act in the future is fixed, is an issue for libertarians. After arguing that the libertarian need not be too concerned by these difficulties, I turn to two further potential issues, namely that eternalism cannot allow for a type of causation that libertarianism requires, and also that it fails to allow for a view of change libertarians may favour. Once more, I find both of these supposed difficulties wanting. Given my discussion of the issues, I conclude that there are some plausible reasons to think that libertarian views of freedom are compatible with eternalism, or at the very least some variants of libertarianism are. As such, I take it that my students, and those like them who worry that there is such an incompatibility, are wrong to do so.
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13. ‘Power-ing up Neo-Aristotelian Natural Goodness’, (2021) Philosophical Studies 178:3755-3775.
Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Powers/dispositions are paradigm cases of entities that have an end, so say many metaphysicians. A question therefore arises, namely, can one account for neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of an ontology of powers? This is what I shall begin to explore in this paper. I will first provide a brief explication of both neo-Aristotelian goodness and the metaphysics of powers, before turning to investigate whether one can give an account of neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of powers. I will suggest that the answer to this question is yes.
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12. ‘Inaugurated Hyperspace’, (2021) Theologica 5:5-27.
Several philosophers of religion have used contemporary work on the metaphysics of space to dismantle objections to Christian doctrine. In this paper I shall also make use of work in the metaphysics of space to explore a topic in Christian thought that has received little attention by philosophers, namely inaugurated eschatology. My aim will be to take the conclusions of some biblical scholars who have written on this topic, and then begin to provide some metaphysical models of this doctrine, so as to overcome objections against inaugurated eschatology based on metaphysical concerns.
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11. ‘Constructing life and consciousness, how hard can it be?’, (2020) Sapientia 76:27-53.
How easy is it to construct life and consciousness from the building blocks of reality? Some philosophers seem to think both are pretty easy, whilst others take consciousness to be difficult but life to be no problem. In this paper I question whether we should in fact think this, could life after all be difficult to construct? I contend that the answer to this, much like the answer to how hard consciousness is to construct, largely depends on the nature of life and the building blocks of reality. I will show that many of the considerations as to whether consciousness is hard to construct can be paralleled when thinking about the construction of life, and that given one prominent definition of life, it does in fact seem difficult to construct. I will conclude by offering a few suggestions for future research, and suggest that philosophers should be more hesitant in their affirmation that life is easy to construct.
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10. ‘Arguing to Theism from Consciousness’, (2020) Faith and Philosophy 37:336-362.
I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first give a form of the argument which ultimately, I think is difficult to evaluate. As such I move on to provide what I take to be a stronger argument, where I claim that consciousness given our worldly laws of nature offers rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter point the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.
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9. ‘If anyone is in Christ – new creation!’, (2020) Religious Studies 56:525-541.
This paper investigates the metaphysical transformation that occurs when a believer becomes a new creation, something which hasn’t yet been explored in the literature. I start by setting out what this ontological transformation involves, and then provide two models as to how it might go. The first is a type of substratism, based on a theory of mixing, whilst the second thinks about this transformation in terms of replacementism. Throughout the paper I seek to resolve difficulties that both of these models bring, whilst also showing how other aspects of Christian thought can also be explained by these models.
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8. ‘Meeting the Evil God challenge’, (2020) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101: 489-514. (Co-authored with Max Baker-Hytch)
The evil god challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent, and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry thesis belief in an evil god and belief in a good god are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God; intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries, can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met.
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7. ‘Wherein lies the debate? – Concerning whether God is a person’, (2019) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85:297-317.
Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood: 1.God is a person and so personal (PP) 2.God is non-personal, and so is not a person (NPNP) 3.God is a personal non-person (PNP) The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with (PP) held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and (NPNP) mainly by those who are pantheists. (PNP), however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past. However, within recent times (PNP) has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between (PP) and (PNP) is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive. The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of (PNP) make as to why God cannot be a person (PP) stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive. My suggestion will be that on the whole they do and are not. As such, defenders of (PNP) will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on.
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6. ‘Fine-Tuned of Necessity?’, (2018) Res Philosophica 85:297-317.
This paper seeks to explicate and analyse an alternative response to fine-tuning arguments from those that are typically given, namely design or brute contingency. The response I explore is based on necessity, the necessitarian response. After showing how necessity blocks the argument, I explicate the response I claim necessitarians can give, and suggest how its three requirements can be met. Firstly that laws are metaphysically necessary, secondly that constants are metaphysically necessary, and thirdly that the fundamental properties which determine the laws and constants are necessary. After discussing each in turn, I end the paper by assessing how the response fares when running the fine-tuning argument in two ways, as an inference to best explanation and as a Bayesian argument.
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5. ‘Dis-Positioning Euthyphro’, (2018) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84:31-55.
The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn’t been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God’s role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then I suggest how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally I explain how this all relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies.
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4. ‘Thomas Aquinas, “the Greatest Advocate of Dispositional Modality”,
Fact or Fiction?’, (2017) Studia Neoaristotelica 14:167-188.
Aquinas has been labelled ‘the greatest advocate of dispositional modality’, by one contemporary power theorist. This paper’s goal is to critically analyse this claim. Before doing so, however, it first explicates some components of Aquinas’s ontology of powers, putting him in dialogue with contemporary discussions. Next it explicates the two competing views of the modality of powers, dispositional modality and conditional necessity, and proceeds to examine the textual basis as to which Aquinas held. Ultimately the paper finds in favour of the latter. The paper then concludes with a suggestion as to how Aquinas would explain examples given by those who advocate the dispositional modality position. In answer to the title, therefore, the paper argues that thinking Aquinas the greatest advocate of dispositional modality is a fiction, and that this award belongs to someone else. Thomas Aquinas, ‘the greatest advocate of dispositional modality’, Fact or Fiction? In recent years there has been a widespread appreciation and revived interest in Aristotelian metaphysics, with this being particularly evident from the revival of a non-reductive theory of powers.
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3. ‘The ‘Power’-ful Trinity’, (2017)
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9:87-112.
This paper proposes a new orthodox Latin Trinitarian model of the Trinity, through employing current work from the metaphysics of powers. It outlines theses defended within the contemporary powers literature that form the backbone of the account and then shows how they can be combined to provide an orthodox metaphysics of the Trinity. Having done this it addresses a further element required for orthodoxy, the ontological priority of the Father, and then notes a particular benefit that comes along with the model. The paper concludes by posing and answering some objections one might raise against the account.
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2. ‘Aquinas on Forms, Substances and Artifacts’, (2016) Vivarium 54:1-21. (Co-authored with Anna Marmodoro)
Thomas Aquinas sees a sharp metaphysical distinction between artifacts and substances, but does not offer any explicit account of it. We argue that for Aquinas the contribution that an artisan makes to the generation of a product compromises the causal responsibility of the form of that product for what the product is; hence it compromises the metaphysical unity of the product to that of an accidental unity. By contrast, the metaphysical unity of a substance is achieved by a process of generation whereby the substantial form is solely responsible for what each part and the whole of a substance are. This, we submit, is where the metaphysical difference between artifacts and substances lies, for Aquinas. We offer a novel account of the causal process of generation of substances in terms of descending forms, and we bring out its explanatory merits by contrasting it to other existing accounts in the literature.
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1. ‘The Dispositionalist Deity: How God Creates Laws And Why Theists
Should Care’, (2015) Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion 50:113-137.
How does God govern the world? For many theists ‘laws of nature’ play a vital role. But what are these laws, metaphysically speaking? I shall argue that laws of nature are not external to the objects they govern, but instead should be thought of as reducible to internal features of properties. Recent work in metaphysics and philosophy of science has revived a dispositionalist conception of nature, according to which nature is not passive, but active and dynamic. Disposition theorists see particulars as being internally powerful rather than being governed by external laws of nature, making external laws in effect ontologically otiose. I will argue that theists should prefer a dispositionalist ontology, since it leads them towards the theory of concurrentism in divine conservation, rather than occasionalism, and revives the distinction between internal and external teleology. God on this view does not govern the world through external laws of nature, but rather through internal aspects of powerful properties.
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